Matthew Duss & Ben Birnbaum [Foreign Entanglements]
Hello welcome to foreign entanglements on that dust I'm a policy analyst at the Center for American Progress joining me today is Ben Birnbaum a reporter in foreign affairs national security for the Washington Times how are you doing Ben but so we are going to talk as we often do on this program about Iran and some other Middle East issues we'll get to Iraq and a piece that then wrote a couple weeks ago but first let's let's touch on some of the news from Iran this morning Ben what do you hear well we know that these talks with the p5 plus one are going to get started I believe April at the exact day April 13th April 13th with a location to be determined as I understand and so I think the big news there is that any sort of military strike has probably been put off at least at least for several months because as long as there's any pretense of negotiations the Israelis are not gonna feel it in their interest to strike right there was also an article this morning in Haaretz saying that it would Barak because of a number of reasons one of them being this this this leaked CENTCOM war game a few weeks ago in The New York Times that was seen as a pretty a pretty obvious message from the US defense establishment of the US government to say you know hold off on this he has this this Haaretz article was surprising that the Israelis will not strike now until if they do until 2013 so I think yeah I read that I agree with the conclusion though not with his reasoning I don't know how he got from A to B I think that it's more likely than not that they will wait until 2013 for a few reasons I mean if you are leaving a ton Yahoo and you are looking at the US presidential election on the one hand you might have an incentive to strike now because you know you would have include support from the president has specifically asked you to wait until after the election you're not gonna want to alienate him and also if there's a chance that Romney could win and Mitt Romney has basically committed himself to US military action which obviously Israel's first choice in the matter then you know either way if it looks like Romney's gonna win use an incentive wait if it looks like Obama's going to win isn't incentive to wait but that means that they're going yeah let's just jump back to something you you said earlier just a few seconds ago is it if Bibi strikes before November Obama will have to support it this will have no choice no just just draw down a little bit I mean why is that just because in the heat of an election and he's already been tagged unfairly I think as being anti-israel and there's no way he's going to alienate and that's just Jewish voters but I mean I think voters in general I think strike on Iran by Israel would probably have overwhelming support at least in the u.
S. certainly not in Europe but I expect that he would not give anything but I agree with that I think it's worth talking through a little bit I mean we've got you know one of the kind of themes of these of this debate that we've been having over the past year or two years about Israeli or your u.s. strikes is is it so you know obviously it's a level of risk not to to wait but there's an extreme level of risk to a strike as well I think we've had numerous reports numerous war games that have come to very very similar conclusions in regard to the consequences of a strike for for US troops for US interest for u.s. relationships and I would call it a fairly strong consensus that you know there's some very very likely negative consequences and that's a reason to wait but yet the political reality is such that of separating out the kind of analytical defense establishment foreign policy establishment take on this versus the political take on this which is that the US would have to jump in and support if the Israelis decided to strike I mean it sounds like there's a tension there between what we've defined as our interests and what we might have to do because of political imperatives well III think you know there is also the issue of timing and but these really see their window for action rapidly closing I've heard people say that they think you know by the time after the election it will be too late for didn't and they've been pressing the administration to give a commitment and that if they wait and their window for action closes that if everything else fails the administration that Obama will strike and I don't think they've done that commitment and some sort of progress in these talks coming up I think Israel will strike sooner or later I had to guess it would probably be you know or early 2013 but then again there's also the issue of weather and as I've been told and they don't quite understand this but I know they need to have clear skies for a certain amount of time they need to have a guarantee of clear skies for a certain number of days and that window as I understand it closes in October and doesn't open up again until sometime in the spring and by that time it might be too late for them so I'm curious one of my other bills or I guess some way call it obsessions or just you know or something I'm known to be varying and I was very annoying about let's say is this distinction between preventive and preemptive and I'm just kind of curious for your take on this I mean I often see those terms used interchangeably when in fact they mean very different things and have much difference are legal they're grounded in much different legal standards you know there's a recognition in international law generally that if your enemy is clearly massing to attack we're taking steps that would obviously directly lead them to attacking you right there you add since 1967 war is is they have you know the most obvious example then pre-emptive action you attack them first but preventive means something different I mean that the war was you know they promulgated in the Bush Doctrine the attack on Iraq the invasion of Iraq was was a preventive action it was not that Saddam was preparing to attack us it was just that you know it was argued that sometime in the future he could give WMD to terrorists etc I mean it seems that an attack on Iran would clearly be in the latter category a preventive attack you know just preventing them Iran may not be preparing to put a nuke on the missile a well in fact even if if and when they do obtain a nuke and even years from now if they were putting that nuke on top of a missile that might be one thing but just kind of doing what they're doing now does not rise to the level of I I agree they have all language that released calling it but then you agree I think the Israelis would argue that since they in their targets have been attacked by Iran or Iranian proxies for years that anything is your response at the level of justification I certainly think that there is a consensus in Israel that regardless of when whether they should strike now or later with us back here without us packing I think you'll find very few people will argue that Israel can or they live under Iranian nuclear shadow I think you'll see some of those people in in the Israeli discourse I think we've talked before about people like Ephraim hollaby the former Mossad chief and I don't know that he's come out and argued in favor of containment when he has repeatedly stressed that you know had talked you know kind of pushed back against hysteria as he calls it this idea that the idea of an existential threat have you know what I'm talking about the if you read his comments I I read some of his comments obviously of June we had may Oregon get this interview to 60 minutes but I think the debate within Israel within that Israeli government security community is moreover the how and the when of a strike than on the weather I don't think you'll find many people who knew will argue for containment I just I don't see how it works in the Israeli Iranian hey you don't have a nuclear hotline between Iran and Jerusalem and I think given how volatile the region it is I would be very easy to see many nuclear prices and intently one spinning out of control and if you don't have that hotline it's easy to see how many people would like to say that you actually assert destruction assures that there will be no exchange I'm not sure I buy that I think you could you know you could see some miscalculation or something this percept and it's been out of control and and I think that the chances are zero that there would be some I think that is the biggest danger of a nuclear weapon eyes even in Iran with a nuclear weapon yeah I don't buy the idea that they would give it to Hezbollah or some other terrorist group but after having committed that you know after having invested so much you know financially economically politically and borne all kinds of international opprobrium to do so I doubt that you know having done that they would then hand it over to some terrorist proxy I think the you know the kind of first strike is unlikely I think they wanted for mainly for regime regime preservation and their own deterrence but yes I think once you get into a situation like that the idea whether it give some accident in the Strait of Hormuz some other escalation on Iran's or Israel's border weather with Hamas or with or with his bola it could could spiral out of control so yeah I I think that's that's that's a concern I do I think I there was a piece written by last name is fear on a few a couple months ago I think though that looked at some of the data on this and and found that pretty you know the the data of the behavior of States once they got you know nuclear states with nuclear weapons once they got that nuclear intended overwhelmingly to engage in in more risk-averse behavior now I mean that in itself is not a reason to kind of completely chill out you know Iran may very well be the outlier on this but I thought that was very interesting just in terms of you looking at other states you've been in similar situations I think it goes to this idea that Iran under with its nuclear with a nuclear umbrella would be much more to stabilizing would be much more adventurous would be much more reckless that may be but the actual data that we have about nuclear weapons States is that they become less reckless I mean the problem is that our data on states with nuclear weapons in the history is really quite limited and so I think the entire idea that Matt is it works and it's a great idea you know it's only because we've had no but 260 years of history with a few states and nothing's happened but you know we've come very close and I think we'd be having a very different discussion today about Israel and Iran at the Cuban Missile Crisis played out just a little differently so I'm very wary of over learning from the lessons of history here because it is a different case the players are different you have different variables that you didn't have in other cases I do think that even though the risks of a strike are great so are the risks of a nuclear Iran and I certainly think that's how Israelis view it I think they view the trade-off is between taking up a band-aid and then having you know a few weeks or even even a few months of hell and having sort of a drip drip water towards growth over the next 10 15 hmm I also agree that it's important not to you know whether it's we call it over learning lessons history or simply romanticizing the Cold War as this era of great power stability I mean you mentioned the Cuban Missile Crisis there were other examples too that's the best known but it wasn't as if you know these two powers with these all these hundreds of missiles pointed at each other wasn't great you know there were it was essentially living on a knife's edge or decade after decade and it's not a state of affairs that we should hope to recreate ever but again it really comes back to the level of the level of risk we were willing to to to accept and as you said whether it the risks of striking now and doing what the consequences are better in a number of you know for whatever reason than dealing with the risks over a number of years the question is what would we expect to happen and I think there's a lot of loose talk World War three and and sort of what the Iranian response would be and I think there's certainly a range of outcomes here and it could be everything from Iran sort of offering open retaliation and playing the victim in the international community and you know something of a more full-throated response that somehow it draws in the u.
S. what's your sense of how they would respond you know given they have they have a tendency to kind of alienate potential partners they have a tendency sometimes to just do things that don't make sense and I think that's what's dangerous it might be the smartest possible thing that they could do would just be as you just said play the victor right you know maybe some nominal strikes here and there a few Rockets not to say that that's nothing but what kind of a nominal response just to show that we can strike we have this depth if we if we want it but at the same time you kind of ride the international outrage that what I think would very very likely follow such a strike to its draw from the NPT kick the inspectors out and go full-bore on toward toward that weapon indeed the argument I've heard is that they would certainly want to offer retaliation against Israel what would probably stop short of doing anything that would draw in the u.s. just because they you know then their Navy would be at risk their other out heads but I get stuff to say because these things it's spiraling out of control yeah no I think that's right and I think there's no way even even within the Iranian regime which is notoriously opaque I have very little idea about the actual decision-making processes that would that would occur I would be very very surprised if they themselves haven't gained this out in various ways have considered various responses and the various costs and benefits of those responses I think at the very least they would use that moment immediately after a strike just to simply say well listen you used intelligence that you obtained from the IAEA to launch these strikes so it's information we shared we're going to pull out of this process this process is no longer legitimate for us and you you know you've just demonstrated to us why we need a nuclear deterrent and I think they wouldn't have a lot of international support for that for that position if not support them at least yeah do you think there's any prospect that Obama after the election might strike he says he's not taking any options off the table he's even ratcheted up the language a little bit saying that containment is not an option for him or is not his policy I forget the exact word do you think he means it yeah I think he takes the issue of non-proliferation very very seriously I don't think any mission down in it so that combined with the engagement with Iran Iran he'll be as is a major item on his his foreign policy agenda whether that means he would strike you know I'm really given the the the resistance to this idea from the military for a number of reasons it would be a very very tough call even in the best of situations had we not been involved in two wars for the past ten years I'm always skeptical that he would no I think that's not the only option where I mean there are there kind of covert options there's the sabotage options I think that have been going on for a while I'm not saying I necessarily support you know a sort of Special Forces attack on they're rotting nuclear installations but I tend to think that if they were going to be more energetic options on the menu no military options I'm kind of curious about that choice instead of just a large-scale airstrike you know a counter-strike campaign which would you know which which would take more than days it would be a week's of strikes to just you know to do what we had to do till we could convince ourselves or satisfy ourselves that we'd struck enough of the installations to to set the program back you know to justify you know the total shitstorm that I think would would to outright I mean what do you think I mean I used to think that there was no chance this president would strike just because I did not be delaying the language he was using was so big you know all options on the table and he really didn't show any enthusiasm for this I think at this point he really has boxed himself into a corner I mean if you say that containment is not my policy very hard to turn around and then adopt a policy of containment so I would not be surprised if he if you guys strike and I know I know some very senior people think that that he will strike after the election no and he's been surprising in other ways so I mean I certainly don't think the Israelis gonna bet but that's tough to say you don't think you don't think he's successfully convinced him that he's serious you know there was all of this report that we should mention in my arive Israeli newspaper saying that Obama had offered an attorney who advanced bunker-busting bombs and then I guess refueling tankers and actually tacit support for a strike if nittany acquittal would wait until after the election and I would not be at all surprised if that did happen though I think the smart money is it will not go down this year but I think that the chances of the of Israel and/or the u.
S. allowing Iran to go nuclear without trying to stop it first are pretty much closer to zero and I don't know if you would agree with that well I mean when we meet when we talk about going nuclear I obtained a weapon or just getting up to the finish line because I mean that was you know that remains a point of disagreement between the Israeli and the American position you're saying that they might want to have a Canadian option a Japanese option right I mean I think that's in my view that's what the evidence points to you right now is that they are kind of made that various projects going you know they're kind of moving them each along in their own ways to kind of get them all one by one up to the finish line you know and in you know months from now whenever they get all these things completed they'll they'll just kind of stop and be whatever weeks away from from a weapon if they decide that they they want to get one of course there'll be lots of ways that we can be able to detect if and when they make that decision so I think that does offer us you know that offers some something of a cushion I mean it's not it's not a guarantee but still I mean Israel's position as articulated by Netanyahu is that we cannot live with an Iranian nuclear capability um that was a major ask for a pact with this with their last conference and their big lobbying day this um this resolution that came from Graham and Lieberman you know asking or trying to move the u.
S. red line to where the Israeli red line is on capability versus messin and that didn't happen President Obama in his speech to AIPAC you know very stressed that he is talking about an Iranian nuclear weapon not a capability and I thought it was really interesting that even in this speech right before President Obama's um Israeli President Shimon Peres said the same thing he constantly said Iranian weapon Iranian nuclear weapon he did not say capability so I found that I was you know struck by that level of support by Paris for Obama's position versus you know right I am in the Israeli red lines half shift back in 2007 they were talking about the technological point of no return and I think we're either points of no return that we've since cross though I suppose it is possible that the red line would fit but very right you know it's I mean as a bargaining tactic it's it's very clever and you've got to give Netanyahu credit here you know this idea that oK we've waited we waited we've moved our red lines we've moved our red lines and he's made such a big deal about you know you know the danger is growing and you made it known that he and Barack want to strike and they really want to do this so it's almost like every day that Israel does not strike he so it's sort of presented as a concern to the president you know every day that we don't do this thing that has massive consequences for ourselves in the world you know it's kind of yes give us credit for not doing this today I mean he has incentive to put a bluster because that at least right now that's been successful in getting the Europeans and the other world players to implement now that sort of crippling sanctions then we're seeing I think that if we do see a strike later this year you know the great tragedy will has been these sanctions that they've been implemented a little bit earlier particularly by the Europeans I might have actually worked you know I guess they could still work we'll see what happens in the talk but I think that could end up being the greatest tragedy you know that's interesting yeah I don't really know what to say about that you know the idea that if only we've done this a year ago or two years ago and draw that out of it I mean well I I think that there was certainly reason I mean from the US standpoint at the very beginning of the Obama administration we did have a process going and I think they would argue correctly I think that the sincere outreach was vital in getting people eventually to agree to the same absolutely but but we have not had a process since what the toxin Istanbul broke out they knew January 2010 I don't really say the good reason why this EU oil or mark or the central bank's tank and from the US were imposed back then instead of few months ago and I think it's possible that the regime might be more willing to deal right now if the effects of the sanctions have been more advanced you know so will you make up before we move on to your Iraq piece I don't know how closely you follow the Iranian parliamentary elections okay what I said you can say something yeah well I mean why I want a peach shortly afterward just you know clearly it seems very clear that how many supporters it would you know these are not fair elections we all know this they were essentially used as a bit of editor to for domestic consumption but also for international consumption I think mainly for the former it's a show that you know I made a is still the decision maker he's still in charge he completely slapped down on money money Nejad is you know I mean John's followers were routed the Conservatives and alter conservatives and support accommodated very very well so he's now back in you know having faced this sort of up Sturridge from Wadena jobs followers and the President Hamid II himself he's now tough to them he's back very much unquestioned in his power to what does this mean for the nuclear talks I'm not sure how many is known to be very very suspicious of the possibility of a deal he seems to be very paranoid he's just convinced everything's a trick but if he's kind of reestablished and reestablished his own unquestioned supremacy like that you know like that might there be some room now that there's he's not facing any sort of internal serious challenge for him to give some of his talk to at least try to find some way to start building trust with with the West I think there's a possibility I'm not sure I remain skeptical but you know trying to trick I think the number one I think well one question that we need to ask you know your talk and I think it's correct in some respect that a strike would certainly help the regime in terms of public opinion in Iran and would actually give them a pretext to crack down even further on the opposition you know some people like Korean side therefore say it would resuscitate the regime for a generation so you have to wonder I mean is it not then in their interest get bomb run it you know I mean if they're no I think I think no yeah right I dream I think said this um just yesterday and hearing in the Senate yeah I don't think it's their desire I don't think we'd say that but yes I think clearly they do see some benefits to a situation like that I think it would you know they would obviously go to how how much they were about how big a strike it was but yeah I just I see more and more people well not more and more but there are people who have suggested that you know strikes would enable or empower Iranians to rise up against the regime and I see absolutely no evidence that's yeah I mean I spoke to Jamie fly here on foreign entanglements a few weeks ago about his fees and court affairs that aren't in this authors have suggested it I did I I think it's just fantastically yeah I don't see any historical evidence for that all right on that note of agreement let's move on quickly to just discuss you you had an interview with the Iraqi political leader on allow II why don't you just you have to describe what you talk to him we talked about several issues I don't think there's anything too surprising I do think was interesting when he talked about Iran yet allow iam worse was the former prime minister from 2004-2005 secular Shiite then in the past election led Iraq eeeh which was mostly Sunni and and I think to most people surprised beam out ahead of Maliki in the vote count but was not able to form the government just because Maliki had the support of solder and the Kurds so he's been left sort of outside the pole he was supposed to get first he wanted to be President they wouldn't give him that and then he was supposed to have this sort of strategic policy council that didn't exist at the time and in still doesn't really exist and then you turn that down when said that they refused to give him much authority so if you have this weird situation where Iraq Kia is part of the government and he really isn't and you know so he's essentially an opposition leader in a sentence and he's very bitter he thinks that the u.
S. could have done or its sporty hammer to support the process and put more pressure on Maliki then obviously he's very concerned about the role of Iran in Iraqi politics and told me that Iran its belief swallowed was the word he used it swallowed a rocks since the invasion and it was interesting when he said that a strike on Iran he was completely against the idea of a strike on Iran by anybody but at the same time he called on the u.s. to engage in and use the word regime chain by supporting the opposition inside Iran and that support them with with their media give them material support and you basically said that this was the approach that he recommended in the run-up to the Iraq war you know don't just military force but help the opposition from within so I thought that was interesting no I did I thought his comments on Iran very interesting too I think you did yeah you got that's what I heard as well I mean talking down strikes but saying it's kind of a long-term process um well what do you think of what he is well going back to the Iran swallowing Iran I mean this is something that I mean has been clear for a long time I mean I think this was you know clear very early on in America's doing the invasion and occupation the extent to which Iran was getting into Iran and in one way it should have been very obvious you know their neighbors they know we Rock much better than we do they've had partly relationships with a lot of these players for years and years including you know people like Maliki who himself took refuge in me in Iran for a while when he was in exile for me rock parties like the currency exactly so I have to you know I'm almost entertained by the extent to which I see a lot of you people who supported the war many conservatives mainly sort of sounding the alarm on Iranian influence in Iraq when a lot of us who were who were critics.
Of the occupation were pointing this out years and years ago and it seems only now you know that President Obama has taken over the policy and withdrawn US troops that this this is a problem do you see if you disconnect there or what what do you think yeah well I just think people didn't think it through before the war there was that great Bush moments I forget whose book it was where somebody explains to Bush the difference you know the rocks party do any partly she I didn't which says I I thought they were all Muslim and I could think unfortunately that was the level of the discourse before the invasion so you know I don't think there was anything that predictable about this and I mean I think interestingly you know I talking to Iraqis for you know years ago I mean as one one Iraqi Shia this is Iraqis Shiite we had considered himself a supporter of Sadr for years and was very very disenchanted with the saw dress when I suppose daily business 2008 that way he put it as the the United States has baked Iraq like a cake and given it to Iran to eat and that's something I just was remembered interestingly it's seen a while it's important to note Iran's influence in Iraq I also think it's important not to overstate it I think you know there is a pretty powerful strain of Iraqi nationalism even among Iraqi Shiites and even even it no and they have shown some independence not too much on Syria I think they stain from the recent General Assembly resolution whereas Lebanon waited for it so but the question is if they may be looking briefly on Syria if Assad does fall it's that not give Iran incentive to sort of double down in Iraq really try to cultivate that aliveness no I think no that's a good question I mean we've got the Arab League meeting in Baghdad for the first time and I think two decades no so you're all kind of rate you know reestablishing it's it or just you know highlighting its Arab identity which i think is good I mean seeing Iraq more more integrated.
Back into that into that world after years of hostility and standoffish this by a lot of the leading Arab governments is good what that you know and seeing Iraq as a possible point of contact between the Arab world and Iran I think also has seal dispositive implications for that as well but yeah let's quickly go to Syria before we finish up what are your thoughts I Ivan I think it's clear that you know we don't really have any options or at least we're not giving ourselves any options and it seems like there was a little magical thinking on the part of the Washington establishment that somehow you know it's not we're just hold like a house of cards that may still happen but I don't think people thought through the mechanism and I mean it was very unlikely that you're going to see an Egypt or a Tunisia like situation play out just because of the sectarian dynamic nooner and I think people really didn't appreciate you know very solid base of support waiting with the argue whether it was whether it's 20% or 30% but it's clear that he does have a floor of support you know just from the Alawite sand from the Christiansen right now in there and they seem pretty you know all this fighting and all this international condemnation as it tends to do a situation like this has solidified this very very hardcore I mean there's they know there's one way out for them and that's you know eventually yeah so they're just gonna they see no reason to stop fighting it seems the cook you know the you know an Assad will I think do what he's continued to do what you know is with this Assad is a Kofi Annan plan that we saw sure he'll accept it but he'll keep on doing what he's gonna do anyway what do you think I I haven't read it in detail I mean I know that it you know offers an Assad a chance to stay in power which I just sure that's a nice idea if we want to end this peacefully but I don't think any of the parties in Syria see this ending peacefully does that sound right to you.
Well I was just a little puzzled I don't know whether an on himself used this as a is a transitional you in or whether he really does think that there is a final solution here we're a stock remain in town you know I think that if that is his view then he's done a great disservice everyone in sort of you know Mickey it seemed like we were reaching an international consensus that I thought had to go you know and so I can't but think that this is not helpful right yeah I know that's my take is wrong I mean you know it's I mean calling back over the last year you know you're more more than a year as we've been discussing this I think it's about a year you know since the Syria revolution of the uprising kicked off no it's amazing it's it's just one of those things that you know and we thought we had kind of talk through this r2p that's rather responsibility to protect we see how complicated that is you know it's yet another one these situations that sort of demonstrates the inability of people to really do anything we're all kind of stuck here on the sidelines you've got Turkey I think which has done some impressive things and shown you know on the margins but still everybody's kind of standing around looking at each other going ok how do we end this yeah III think the administration if Turkey and Saudi Arabia are willing to take a lead they might be willing to be more engaged but and unfortunately I think we're in for more of the same for at least at least several more months I'm not a optimistic note I think we can finish up thanks a lot Ben it was great talking to you thanks Matt all right talk to you good soon you again soon all right.
S. certainly not in Europe but I expect that he would not give anything but I agree with that I think it's worth talking through a little bit I mean we've got you know one of the kind of themes of these of this debate that we've been having over the past year or two years about Israeli or your u.s. strikes is is it so you know obviously it's a level of risk not to to wait but there's an extreme level of risk to a strike as well I think we've had numerous reports numerous war games that have come to very very similar conclusions in regard to the consequences of a strike for for US troops for US interest for u.s. relationships and I would call it a fairly strong consensus that you know there's some very very likely negative consequences and that's a reason to wait but yet the political reality is such that of separating out the kind of analytical defense establishment foreign policy establishment take on this versus the political take on this which is that the US would have to jump in and support if the Israelis decided to strike I mean it sounds like there's a tension there between what we've defined as our interests and what we might have to do because of political imperatives well III think you know there is also the issue of timing and but these really see their window for action rapidly closing I've heard people say that they think you know by the time after the election it will be too late for didn't and they've been pressing the administration to give a commitment and that if they wait and their window for action closes that if everything else fails the administration that Obama will strike and I don't think they've done that commitment and some sort of progress in these talks coming up I think Israel will strike sooner or later I had to guess it would probably be you know or early 2013 but then again there's also the issue of weather and as I've been told and they don't quite understand this but I know they need to have clear skies for a certain amount of time they need to have a guarantee of clear skies for a certain number of days and that window as I understand it closes in October and doesn't open up again until sometime in the spring and by that time it might be too late for them so I'm curious one of my other bills or I guess some way call it obsessions or just you know or something I'm known to be varying and I was very annoying about let's say is this distinction between preventive and preemptive and I'm just kind of curious for your take on this I mean I often see those terms used interchangeably when in fact they mean very different things and have much difference are legal they're grounded in much different legal standards you know there's a recognition in international law generally that if your enemy is clearly massing to attack we're taking steps that would obviously directly lead them to attacking you right there you add since 1967 war is is they have you know the most obvious example then pre-emptive action you attack them first but preventive means something different I mean that the war was you know they promulgated in the Bush Doctrine the attack on Iraq the invasion of Iraq was was a preventive action it was not that Saddam was preparing to attack us it was just that you know it was argued that sometime in the future he could give WMD to terrorists etc I mean it seems that an attack on Iran would clearly be in the latter category a preventive attack you know just preventing them Iran may not be preparing to put a nuke on the missile a well in fact even if if and when they do obtain a nuke and even years from now if they were putting that nuke on top of a missile that might be one thing but just kind of doing what they're doing now does not rise to the level of I I agree they have all language that released calling it but then you agree I think the Israelis would argue that since they in their targets have been attacked by Iran or Iranian proxies for years that anything is your response at the level of justification I certainly think that there is a consensus in Israel that regardless of when whether they should strike now or later with us back here without us packing I think you'll find very few people will argue that Israel can or they live under Iranian nuclear shadow I think you'll see some of those people in in the Israeli discourse I think we've talked before about people like Ephraim hollaby the former Mossad chief and I don't know that he's come out and argued in favor of containment when he has repeatedly stressed that you know had talked you know kind of pushed back against hysteria as he calls it this idea that the idea of an existential threat have you know what I'm talking about the if you read his comments I I read some of his comments obviously of June we had may Oregon get this interview to 60 minutes but I think the debate within Israel within that Israeli government security community is moreover the how and the when of a strike than on the weather I don't think you'll find many people who knew will argue for containment I just I don't see how it works in the Israeli Iranian hey you don't have a nuclear hotline between Iran and Jerusalem and I think given how volatile the region it is I would be very easy to see many nuclear prices and intently one spinning out of control and if you don't have that hotline it's easy to see how many people would like to say that you actually assert destruction assures that there will be no exchange I'm not sure I buy that I think you could you know you could see some miscalculation or something this percept and it's been out of control and and I think that the chances are zero that there would be some I think that is the biggest danger of a nuclear weapon eyes even in Iran with a nuclear weapon yeah I don't buy the idea that they would give it to Hezbollah or some other terrorist group but after having committed that you know after having invested so much you know financially economically politically and borne all kinds of international opprobrium to do so I doubt that you know having done that they would then hand it over to some terrorist proxy I think the you know the kind of first strike is unlikely I think they wanted for mainly for regime regime preservation and their own deterrence but yes I think once you get into a situation like that the idea whether it give some accident in the Strait of Hormuz some other escalation on Iran's or Israel's border weather with Hamas or with or with his bola it could could spiral out of control so yeah I I think that's that's that's a concern I do I think I there was a piece written by last name is fear on a few a couple months ago I think though that looked at some of the data on this and and found that pretty you know the the data of the behavior of States once they got you know nuclear states with nuclear weapons once they got that nuclear intended overwhelmingly to engage in in more risk-averse behavior now I mean that in itself is not a reason to kind of completely chill out you know Iran may very well be the outlier on this but I thought that was very interesting just in terms of you looking at other states you've been in similar situations I think it goes to this idea that Iran under with its nuclear with a nuclear umbrella would be much more to stabilizing would be much more adventurous would be much more reckless that may be but the actual data that we have about nuclear weapons States is that they become less reckless I mean the problem is that our data on states with nuclear weapons in the history is really quite limited and so I think the entire idea that Matt is it works and it's a great idea you know it's only because we've had no but 260 years of history with a few states and nothing's happened but you know we've come very close and I think we'd be having a very different discussion today about Israel and Iran at the Cuban Missile Crisis played out just a little differently so I'm very wary of over learning from the lessons of history here because it is a different case the players are different you have different variables that you didn't have in other cases I do think that even though the risks of a strike are great so are the risks of a nuclear Iran and I certainly think that's how Israelis view it I think they view the trade-off is between taking up a band-aid and then having you know a few weeks or even even a few months of hell and having sort of a drip drip water towards growth over the next 10 15 hmm I also agree that it's important not to you know whether it's we call it over learning lessons history or simply romanticizing the Cold War as this era of great power stability I mean you mentioned the Cuban Missile Crisis there were other examples too that's the best known but it wasn't as if you know these two powers with these all these hundreds of missiles pointed at each other wasn't great you know there were it was essentially living on a knife's edge or decade after decade and it's not a state of affairs that we should hope to recreate ever but again it really comes back to the level of the level of risk we were willing to to to accept and as you said whether it the risks of striking now and doing what the consequences are better in a number of you know for whatever reason than dealing with the risks over a number of years the question is what would we expect to happen and I think there's a lot of loose talk World War three and and sort of what the Iranian response would be and I think there's certainly a range of outcomes here and it could be everything from Iran sort of offering open retaliation and playing the victim in the international community and you know something of a more full-throated response that somehow it draws in the u.
S. what's your sense of how they would respond you know given they have they have a tendency to kind of alienate potential partners they have a tendency sometimes to just do things that don't make sense and I think that's what's dangerous it might be the smartest possible thing that they could do would just be as you just said play the victor right you know maybe some nominal strikes here and there a few Rockets not to say that that's nothing but what kind of a nominal response just to show that we can strike we have this depth if we if we want it but at the same time you kind of ride the international outrage that what I think would very very likely follow such a strike to its draw from the NPT kick the inspectors out and go full-bore on toward toward that weapon indeed the argument I've heard is that they would certainly want to offer retaliation against Israel what would probably stop short of doing anything that would draw in the u.s. just because they you know then their Navy would be at risk their other out heads but I get stuff to say because these things it's spiraling out of control yeah no I think that's right and I think there's no way even even within the Iranian regime which is notoriously opaque I have very little idea about the actual decision-making processes that would that would occur I would be very very surprised if they themselves haven't gained this out in various ways have considered various responses and the various costs and benefits of those responses I think at the very least they would use that moment immediately after a strike just to simply say well listen you used intelligence that you obtained from the IAEA to launch these strikes so it's information we shared we're going to pull out of this process this process is no longer legitimate for us and you you know you've just demonstrated to us why we need a nuclear deterrent and I think they wouldn't have a lot of international support for that for that position if not support them at least yeah do you think there's any prospect that Obama after the election might strike he says he's not taking any options off the table he's even ratcheted up the language a little bit saying that containment is not an option for him or is not his policy I forget the exact word do you think he means it yeah I think he takes the issue of non-proliferation very very seriously I don't think any mission down in it so that combined with the engagement with Iran Iran he'll be as is a major item on his his foreign policy agenda whether that means he would strike you know I'm really given the the the resistance to this idea from the military for a number of reasons it would be a very very tough call even in the best of situations had we not been involved in two wars for the past ten years I'm always skeptical that he would no I think that's not the only option where I mean there are there kind of covert options there's the sabotage options I think that have been going on for a while I'm not saying I necessarily support you know a sort of Special Forces attack on they're rotting nuclear installations but I tend to think that if they were going to be more energetic options on the menu no military options I'm kind of curious about that choice instead of just a large-scale airstrike you know a counter-strike campaign which would you know which which would take more than days it would be a week's of strikes to just you know to do what we had to do till we could convince ourselves or satisfy ourselves that we'd struck enough of the installations to to set the program back you know to justify you know the total shitstorm that I think would would to outright I mean what do you think I mean I used to think that there was no chance this president would strike just because I did not be delaying the language he was using was so big you know all options on the table and he really didn't show any enthusiasm for this I think at this point he really has boxed himself into a corner I mean if you say that containment is not my policy very hard to turn around and then adopt a policy of containment so I would not be surprised if he if you guys strike and I know I know some very senior people think that that he will strike after the election no and he's been surprising in other ways so I mean I certainly don't think the Israelis gonna bet but that's tough to say you don't think you don't think he's successfully convinced him that he's serious you know there was all of this report that we should mention in my arive Israeli newspaper saying that Obama had offered an attorney who advanced bunker-busting bombs and then I guess refueling tankers and actually tacit support for a strike if nittany acquittal would wait until after the election and I would not be at all surprised if that did happen though I think the smart money is it will not go down this year but I think that the chances of the of Israel and/or the u.
S. allowing Iran to go nuclear without trying to stop it first are pretty much closer to zero and I don't know if you would agree with that well I mean when we meet when we talk about going nuclear I obtained a weapon or just getting up to the finish line because I mean that was you know that remains a point of disagreement between the Israeli and the American position you're saying that they might want to have a Canadian option a Japanese option right I mean I think that's in my view that's what the evidence points to you right now is that they are kind of made that various projects going you know they're kind of moving them each along in their own ways to kind of get them all one by one up to the finish line you know and in you know months from now whenever they get all these things completed they'll they'll just kind of stop and be whatever weeks away from from a weapon if they decide that they they want to get one of course there'll be lots of ways that we can be able to detect if and when they make that decision so I think that does offer us you know that offers some something of a cushion I mean it's not it's not a guarantee but still I mean Israel's position as articulated by Netanyahu is that we cannot live with an Iranian nuclear capability um that was a major ask for a pact with this with their last conference and their big lobbying day this um this resolution that came from Graham and Lieberman you know asking or trying to move the u.
S. red line to where the Israeli red line is on capability versus messin and that didn't happen President Obama in his speech to AIPAC you know very stressed that he is talking about an Iranian nuclear weapon not a capability and I thought it was really interesting that even in this speech right before President Obama's um Israeli President Shimon Peres said the same thing he constantly said Iranian weapon Iranian nuclear weapon he did not say capability so I found that I was you know struck by that level of support by Paris for Obama's position versus you know right I am in the Israeli red lines half shift back in 2007 they were talking about the technological point of no return and I think we're either points of no return that we've since cross though I suppose it is possible that the red line would fit but very right you know it's I mean as a bargaining tactic it's it's very clever and you've got to give Netanyahu credit here you know this idea that oK we've waited we waited we've moved our red lines we've moved our red lines and he's made such a big deal about you know you know the danger is growing and you made it known that he and Barack want to strike and they really want to do this so it's almost like every day that Israel does not strike he so it's sort of presented as a concern to the president you know every day that we don't do this thing that has massive consequences for ourselves in the world you know it's kind of yes give us credit for not doing this today I mean he has incentive to put a bluster because that at least right now that's been successful in getting the Europeans and the other world players to implement now that sort of crippling sanctions then we're seeing I think that if we do see a strike later this year you know the great tragedy will has been these sanctions that they've been implemented a little bit earlier particularly by the Europeans I might have actually worked you know I guess they could still work we'll see what happens in the talk but I think that could end up being the greatest tragedy you know that's interesting yeah I don't really know what to say about that you know the idea that if only we've done this a year ago or two years ago and draw that out of it I mean well I I think that there was certainly reason I mean from the US standpoint at the very beginning of the Obama administration we did have a process going and I think they would argue correctly I think that the sincere outreach was vital in getting people eventually to agree to the same absolutely but but we have not had a process since what the toxin Istanbul broke out they knew January 2010 I don't really say the good reason why this EU oil or mark or the central bank's tank and from the US were imposed back then instead of few months ago and I think it's possible that the regime might be more willing to deal right now if the effects of the sanctions have been more advanced you know so will you make up before we move on to your Iraq piece I don't know how closely you follow the Iranian parliamentary elections okay what I said you can say something yeah well I mean why I want a peach shortly afterward just you know clearly it seems very clear that how many supporters it would you know these are not fair elections we all know this they were essentially used as a bit of editor to for domestic consumption but also for international consumption I think mainly for the former it's a show that you know I made a is still the decision maker he's still in charge he completely slapped down on money money Nejad is you know I mean John's followers were routed the Conservatives and alter conservatives and support accommodated very very well so he's now back in you know having faced this sort of up Sturridge from Wadena jobs followers and the President Hamid II himself he's now tough to them he's back very much unquestioned in his power to what does this mean for the nuclear talks I'm not sure how many is known to be very very suspicious of the possibility of a deal he seems to be very paranoid he's just convinced everything's a trick but if he's kind of reestablished and reestablished his own unquestioned supremacy like that you know like that might there be some room now that there's he's not facing any sort of internal serious challenge for him to give some of his talk to at least try to find some way to start building trust with with the West I think there's a possibility I'm not sure I remain skeptical but you know trying to trick I think the number one I think well one question that we need to ask you know your talk and I think it's correct in some respect that a strike would certainly help the regime in terms of public opinion in Iran and would actually give them a pretext to crack down even further on the opposition you know some people like Korean side therefore say it would resuscitate the regime for a generation so you have to wonder I mean is it not then in their interest get bomb run it you know I mean if they're no I think I think no yeah right I dream I think said this um just yesterday and hearing in the Senate yeah I don't think it's their desire I don't think we'd say that but yes I think clearly they do see some benefits to a situation like that I think it would you know they would obviously go to how how much they were about how big a strike it was but yeah I just I see more and more people well not more and more but there are people who have suggested that you know strikes would enable or empower Iranians to rise up against the regime and I see absolutely no evidence that's yeah I mean I spoke to Jamie fly here on foreign entanglements a few weeks ago about his fees and court affairs that aren't in this authors have suggested it I did I I think it's just fantastically yeah I don't see any historical evidence for that all right on that note of agreement let's move on quickly to just discuss you you had an interview with the Iraqi political leader on allow II why don't you just you have to describe what you talk to him we talked about several issues I don't think there's anything too surprising I do think was interesting when he talked about Iran yet allow iam worse was the former prime minister from 2004-2005 secular Shiite then in the past election led Iraq eeeh which was mostly Sunni and and I think to most people surprised beam out ahead of Maliki in the vote count but was not able to form the government just because Maliki had the support of solder and the Kurds so he's been left sort of outside the pole he was supposed to get first he wanted to be President they wouldn't give him that and then he was supposed to have this sort of strategic policy council that didn't exist at the time and in still doesn't really exist and then you turn that down when said that they refused to give him much authority so if you have this weird situation where Iraq Kia is part of the government and he really isn't and you know so he's essentially an opposition leader in a sentence and he's very bitter he thinks that the u.
S. could have done or its sporty hammer to support the process and put more pressure on Maliki then obviously he's very concerned about the role of Iran in Iraqi politics and told me that Iran its belief swallowed was the word he used it swallowed a rocks since the invasion and it was interesting when he said that a strike on Iran he was completely against the idea of a strike on Iran by anybody but at the same time he called on the u.s. to engage in and use the word regime chain by supporting the opposition inside Iran and that support them with with their media give them material support and you basically said that this was the approach that he recommended in the run-up to the Iraq war you know don't just military force but help the opposition from within so I thought that was interesting no I did I thought his comments on Iran very interesting too I think you did yeah you got that's what I heard as well I mean talking down strikes but saying it's kind of a long-term process um well what do you think of what he is well going back to the Iran swallowing Iran I mean this is something that I mean has been clear for a long time I mean I think this was you know clear very early on in America's doing the invasion and occupation the extent to which Iran was getting into Iran and in one way it should have been very obvious you know their neighbors they know we Rock much better than we do they've had partly relationships with a lot of these players for years and years including you know people like Maliki who himself took refuge in me in Iran for a while when he was in exile for me rock parties like the currency exactly so I have to you know I'm almost entertained by the extent to which I see a lot of you people who supported the war many conservatives mainly sort of sounding the alarm on Iranian influence in Iraq when a lot of us who were who were critics.
Of the occupation were pointing this out years and years ago and it seems only now you know that President Obama has taken over the policy and withdrawn US troops that this this is a problem do you see if you disconnect there or what what do you think yeah well I just think people didn't think it through before the war there was that great Bush moments I forget whose book it was where somebody explains to Bush the difference you know the rocks party do any partly she I didn't which says I I thought they were all Muslim and I could think unfortunately that was the level of the discourse before the invasion so you know I don't think there was anything that predictable about this and I mean I think interestingly you know I talking to Iraqis for you know years ago I mean as one one Iraqi Shia this is Iraqis Shiite we had considered himself a supporter of Sadr for years and was very very disenchanted with the saw dress when I suppose daily business 2008 that way he put it as the the United States has baked Iraq like a cake and given it to Iran to eat and that's something I just was remembered interestingly it's seen a while it's important to note Iran's influence in Iraq I also think it's important not to overstate it I think you know there is a pretty powerful strain of Iraqi nationalism even among Iraqi Shiites and even even it no and they have shown some independence not too much on Syria I think they stain from the recent General Assembly resolution whereas Lebanon waited for it so but the question is if they may be looking briefly on Syria if Assad does fall it's that not give Iran incentive to sort of double down in Iraq really try to cultivate that aliveness no I think no that's a good question I mean we've got the Arab League meeting in Baghdad for the first time and I think two decades no so you're all kind of rate you know reestablishing it's it or just you know highlighting its Arab identity which i think is good I mean seeing Iraq more more integrated.
Back into that into that world after years of hostility and standoffish this by a lot of the leading Arab governments is good what that you know and seeing Iraq as a possible point of contact between the Arab world and Iran I think also has seal dispositive implications for that as well but yeah let's quickly go to Syria before we finish up what are your thoughts I Ivan I think it's clear that you know we don't really have any options or at least we're not giving ourselves any options and it seems like there was a little magical thinking on the part of the Washington establishment that somehow you know it's not we're just hold like a house of cards that may still happen but I don't think people thought through the mechanism and I mean it was very unlikely that you're going to see an Egypt or a Tunisia like situation play out just because of the sectarian dynamic nooner and I think people really didn't appreciate you know very solid base of support waiting with the argue whether it was whether it's 20% or 30% but it's clear that he does have a floor of support you know just from the Alawite sand from the Christiansen right now in there and they seem pretty you know all this fighting and all this international condemnation as it tends to do a situation like this has solidified this very very hardcore I mean there's they know there's one way out for them and that's you know eventually yeah so they're just gonna they see no reason to stop fighting it seems the cook you know the you know an Assad will I think do what he's continued to do what you know is with this Assad is a Kofi Annan plan that we saw sure he'll accept it but he'll keep on doing what he's gonna do anyway what do you think I I haven't read it in detail I mean I know that it you know offers an Assad a chance to stay in power which I just sure that's a nice idea if we want to end this peacefully but I don't think any of the parties in Syria see this ending peacefully does that sound right to you.
Well I was just a little puzzled I don't know whether an on himself used this as a is a transitional you in or whether he really does think that there is a final solution here we're a stock remain in town you know I think that if that is his view then he's done a great disservice everyone in sort of you know Mickey it seemed like we were reaching an international consensus that I thought had to go you know and so I can't but think that this is not helpful right yeah I know that's my take is wrong I mean you know it's I mean calling back over the last year you know you're more more than a year as we've been discussing this I think it's about a year you know since the Syria revolution of the uprising kicked off no it's amazing it's it's just one of those things that you know and we thought we had kind of talk through this r2p that's rather responsibility to protect we see how complicated that is you know it's yet another one these situations that sort of demonstrates the inability of people to really do anything we're all kind of stuck here on the sidelines you've got Turkey I think which has done some impressive things and shown you know on the margins but still everybody's kind of standing around looking at each other going ok how do we end this yeah III think the administration if Turkey and Saudi Arabia are willing to take a lead they might be willing to be more engaged but and unfortunately I think we're in for more of the same for at least at least several more months I'm not a optimistic note I think we can finish up thanks a lot Ben it was great talking to you thanks Matt all right talk to you good soon you again soon all right.